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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LE.1£ C. FELT, a/k/a
LEF~ CRAIG FELT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROBERT S. FELT,
Defendant-Respondent:

Case No.
12409

ABSTRACT O,F RECORD

R. NO.
(Title of Court and Cause)
COMPLAINT
FOR CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff and defendant are bona fide and actual
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and have been for
more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
1.

2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife,
having been married at Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about
the 17th day of September, 1949. There have been no
children born as issue of said marriage.
1

..
3. During the past several months the defendant
has treated the plaintiff in a cruel manner, to the extent
of causing her great mental distress.
2

4. During the marriage of the parties, they have ,
acquired the following property:
An equity in a residence known as 4147 Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Household furniture, furnishings, appliances
housekeeping equipment, and other household
items
Two automobiles, consisting of a 1963 Volkswagen
and a 1967 Volkswagen.
Other assets, the precise nature and extent of
which are unknown to the plaintiff.
5. If it shall be shovrn to the satisfaction of the
court that there are policies of life insurance in force on
the life of the defendant, it is reasonable and necessary
that defendant be required to maintain the premiums
on said policies and that defendant be ordered to effect
any change which may be necessary to cause the plaintiff
to become the beneficiary of each of said policies or that
defendant be enjoined from changing said policies so as
to eliminate the plaintiff as beneficiary on the same.
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6. The parties have incurred certain obligations
consisting of household bills. It is necessary and reasonable that the defendant be ordered to pay all outstanding
obligations of the parties.
7. It is reasonable and necessary that the plaintiff
be awarded an equitable portion of the assets of the
2

parties, including real and personal property, the savings
of the parties, and one of the automobiles of the parties,
and that plaintiff be awarded a reasonable sum as alimony for her maintenance.
8. Defendant is a healthy and able-bodied person
and is gainfully employed and without having precise
knowledge, plaintiff is informed and believes that defendant's net earnings and income exceeds THIRTY-SIX
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($36,000.00) per year.
9. Plaintiff has engaged attorneys to represent her
in the prosecution of this action and is obligated to pay
them a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendant should be
required to pay a reasonable sum for the use and benefit
of plaintiff's attorneys.
WHEHEFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS FOR JUDGMENT, as follows:
For a decree of divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimoney now existing between the parties and awarding
plaintiff an equitable portion of the assets of the parties,
including real and personal property, the savings of the
parties, and one of the automobiles of the parties; awarding plaintiff a reasonable sum as alimony for the maintenance and support of plaintiff; ordering and directing
the defendant to pay all premiums on any life insurance
policies now in force on his life, and to cause the plaintiff
to become or remain the beneficiary of such life insnrance policies, and directing the defendant to pay all the
outstanding bills and obligations of the parties; awarding
3

plaintiff a reasonable sum for attorneys' fees, together
with costs of this action, and such other and further relief
as the court may deem just in the premises.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Duly verified and filed April 19, 19G7.

(Title of Court and Cause)
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMEN'L'
5

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this
16th day of May, 1967, by and between LEE C. FELT
(hereinafter sometimes called "plaintiff") and ROBERT
S. FELT (hereinafter sometimes called "defendant"),
both of Salt Lake City, State of Utah;
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are now husband and
wife but have separated, and the above-named plaintiff,
Lee C. Felt, has heretofore commenced a suit for divorce
against the defendant, and it is desired to settle and adjust all property rights between the parties, and all other
rights, save and except the marriage relationship.

6

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby understood and
agreed:

4

I.
PROPERTY DIVISION
In settlement, adjustment and compromise of all
property questions and rights, the property of said parties shall be divided as follows:

A. LEE C. FELT shall receive and retain as her
sole and separate property:
1. The following shares of stock valued as
of May 4, 1967 :
(a) Four shares of Hercules stock, Certificate No. BB35279, registered in the name
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $50.75 per share.
(b) One share of Hercules stock, Certificate No. BB29829, registered in the name
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $50.75 per share.
( c) Six shares of CTS Corp. stock, Certificate No. C015939, registered in the name
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $31.63 per share.
( d) Six shares of CTS Corp. stock, Certificate No. N019209, registered in the name
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $31.63 per share.
( e) Nine shares of Gulf Oil Corp. stock,
Certificate No. N0601145, registered in the
name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $65.40 per
share.
(f) Nine shares of National Airlines
stock, Certificate No. N0123047, registered in
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per
share.
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(g) ~i~e shares of National Airlines
stock, Certificate No. N0122165, registered in
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per
share.
(h) Four shares of National Airlines
stock, Certificate No. N0124623, registered in
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per
share.
( i) Twelve shares of Eastman Kodak
stock, Certificate No. N081504, registered in
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $143.87 per
share.
(j) Ten shares of Johnson & Johnson
stock, registered in the name of Lee C. Felt,
valued at $233.00 per share.
2. A 1964 Volkswagen, registered in the
name of Robert S. Felt, who agrees that he will
forthwith transfer and assign all of his right,
title and interest therein to Lee C. Felt.

8

3. The parties to this Agreement hereby confirm and acknowledge that Robert S. Felt, is the
owner of a certain life insurance Policy Number
316060, Initial Sum Insured - $50,000.00, of which
the Old Line Life Insurance Company of America,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is the Insurer and the
defendant, Robert S. Felt, is the Insured. Lee C.
Felt is the beneficiary of said policy. Forthwith
after the execution of this Agreement, Robert S.
Felt will make an absolute assignment of all incidents of ownership in said Policy Number 316060
to Lee C. Felt. Following said absolute assignment, Lee C. Felt will from her own funds pay
any and all insurance renewal premiums as long
as she desires to keep said Policy in force and effect. Provided, further, Lee C. F'elt will have the
right to name anyone she chooses as the bene6

ficiary on said Polic~y No. 316060, including herself. Robert S. Felt agrees that he will at all
times in the future cooperate with Lee C. Felt
in keeping said Policy Number 316060 in force and
effect, except Robert S. Felt will have no obligation to pay any future renewal premiums. Further, if in Lee C. Felt's discretion, said Policy
Number 316060 is converted into a different type
of life insurance policy or if the same is cancelled
and Lee C. Felt desires to replace said Policy
N mnber 316060 with other life insurance on the
life of Robert S. Felt, the defendant agrees that he
will cooperate in all ways with the plaintiff in obtaining such conversion or new insurance, including but not restricted to cooperating in submitting
himself to a physical examination as may be required by the insuring company or companies.
4. Robert S. Felt herein shall forthwith assign to Lee C. Felt all right and interest in or to
any insurance in force upon any personal property
delivered to and/or conveyed to Lee C. Felt pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and deliver
to her any and all applicable insurance policies.
B. ROBERT S. FELT shall receive and retain as
his sole and separate property those properties decribed
below:
1. The following shares of stock in and to
which Lee C. Felt shall forthwith assign to Robert
S. Felt, all of her right, title and interest:
(a) Any and all shares of stock of Medical Arts Building Co., of Salt Lake City, Utah,
standing in the names of Robert S. Felt
and/or Lee C. Felt; in this regard, Lee C. Felt
shall assign and transfer to Robert S. Felt all
of her right, title and interest in and to 750

7

shares of Medical Arts stock registered in the
names of the parties and valued at approximately $1.00 per share, as follows:
(1) One Hundred shares of stock
Certificate No. 1437, purchased Octobe;
13, 1965;
(2) Two Hundred shares of stock
Certificate No. 1223, purchased Octobe;
28, 1960;
(3) Three Hundred Fifty shares of
stock, Certificate No. 1420, purchased
March 15, 1965;
( 4) One Hundred shares of stock,
Certificate No. 1465, purchased August 9,
1966.
10

2. One share of stock (a social membership)
and a certain note (Promissory Note dated January 5, 19·67, No. F-301, Series F) in the principal
amount of $560.00, wherein Robert S. Felt is shown
as the member of said University Club and plaintiff and defendant are shown as joint payees of
said note. Plaintiff agrees to assign said note to
the defendant.
3. A 1967 Volkswagen registered in the name
of Lee C. Felt, who agrees that she will forthwith
transfer and assign all of her right, title and interest therein to Robert S. Felt.
4. Except for plaintiff's personal bank account at Foothill Village Branch of Walker Bank
& Trust Co., which shall belong to plaintiff, the
balances outstanding as of the date of the parties'
separation in all bank accounts, whether savings
or checking, standing the names of either the parties jointly or Robert S. Felt alone, which balances
Robert S. Felt represents are negligible.
8

5: Al~ office equipment, medical equipment,
supplies, fixtures, furniture and any other items
use~ by Robert S. :B-,elt or in any way appropriate
to his practice of his profession.
6. All accounts receivable arising out of professional services rendered by Robert S. Felt, and
goods sold in connection therewith.
7. Any and all other insurance policies,
whether the same be life insurance, health and
accident insurance or disability insurance, wherein
defendant is the insured.
C.

JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY.

1. Residential Property. The residence of
the parties located at 4147 Emigration Canyon,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and vested in said parties
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, shall
forthwith be listed for sale with a licensed broker,
mutually acceptable to the parties, and sold with
all dispatch compatible with realizing from such
sale thE' reasonable market value of said realty
and improvements, it being agreed that the appraised value of $24,750.00 is reasonable. Subsequent to said sale and the payment of commissions, mortgages, taxes, closing costs, and fees
normally paid by the Seller of realty and all expenses required in order to consummate the sale
of the aforesaid real property, the proceeds thereafter remaining shall be divided and delivered to
the parties in equal shares, share and share alike,
it being understood that said equal shares of said
proceeds constitute the separate properties of each
party and are not held in joint tenancy,
2. Piitnarn Growth Fund Stock. Robert S.
Felt shall forthwith cause to be transferred and
delivered to Lee C. Felt as her sole and separate
property 189 shares (valued at approximately
9

$13.37 per share) out of total of 8-±G. 7 shares of the
Putnam Growth Fund, all of which shares are now
registered in the name of Robert S. Felt. The
remaining G44.7 sharrs of the Putnam Growth
Fund shall he and remain the sole and separate
property of Robert S. Felt.

12

3. Star Broadcasting Company Stock and
Drbenturc. rrhe parties acknowledge and confirm
that they are owners, as joint knants, of 3,000
shares of Star Broadcasting Company, valued at
$6,000.00, a debenture in the original principal
amount of $6,500.00, wherein the parties hereto
are payees and Star Broadcasting Company is the
obligor, and 10 shares of stock in a company known
as Pueblo Supermarkets Inc., valued at $20.00 per
share. The parties agree that the assets described
in this paragraph will be divided equally between
them, each to share and own one-half thereof, as
his or her separate property. In this regard, each
party agr<:>es to execute and deliver to and in
favor of the other party such assignments, trans£ers or documents as may be necessary to effectuate such equal division and separte ownership.

D. The parties acknowledge and confirm that they
are the owners of certain household forni tu re, fixtures,
equipment, paintings and miscellaneous properties. The
parties further acknowledge and confirm that they have
reached an understanding relative to the division of
ownership of said items.

E.

JOINT INDEBTEDNESS.
1. The parties shall each pay one-half (lh)
of the balances remaining in charge accounts
standing in the names of the parties or either of

10

them at Z.C.1!.L and Makoff's, of Salt Lake City,
Utah, amountmg to about $750.00.
2. rche parties know of no other unpaid indebtednesses contracted either before or since
their separation. To the extent there are other
indebtednesses, the party who contracted such indebtednesses shall pay the same. Provided, Robert
S. Felt shall pay any debts incurred in connection
with normal living and household expenses incurred prior to separation.
II
ALIMONY SETTLEMENT

The parties agree to an alimony settlelment as follows, except that if the plaintiff should die or remarry,
or if the defendant should die, the obligation of the defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff shall immediately
cease and terminate.
A. Robert S. Felt hereby agrees to pay
$500.00 to the plaintiff Lee C. Felt, upon the execution of this instrument, and thereafter to pay
to the plaintiff Lee C. Felt as permanent alimony,
the sum of $1,000.00 per month, payable each and
every month on or before the first day of the
month, commencing on June 1, 1967.

B. It is further agreed by and between the
parties that the amount of the aforesaid alimony
for the support of Lee C. Felt is a reasonable
sum in view of the efforts made by plaintiff in assisting defendant in his professional education
and considering the present circumstances and
social standing now enjoyed by Lee C. Felt; and
that said amount shall not hereafter be adjusted,
notwithstanding increases or decreases in any
amount in the income of plaintiff, and notwith11

standing any changes in the income of the def endant unless said changes are substantial and so decrease the defendant's income so that defendant is
reasonably unable to pay the alimony agreed to
herein.
·

III.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. It is further agred that should any instrument
of conveyance or transfer or other instrument be required
from either of said parties to the other or to any other
person, to perfect the title to any property divided, transferred or conveyed pursuant to this Agreement, each
party agrees with the other that he and/or she will execute and deliver the same.

B. Each party hereby waives any and all rights in
the estate of the other and forever quitclaims to the other
any and all right to share in the property of the other by
the laws of succession.
C. Each of the parties hereby covenants and agrees
not to contract any debt, charge or liability whatsoever
for which the other of them or his or her property or
estate shall or may become liable or answerable.

15

D. Each of the parties hereby covenants with the
other, that the party making such covenant has no knowledge whatsoever as to any asset of any kind in which the
party so covenanting has any legal or beneficial interest,
aside from those assets already listed, identified and contained herein. In the event either party hereto is violating said covenant by concealing any asset to which he

12
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or she has right, title, or interest, it is agreed that the
party so violating such covenant shall be liable in damages to the other party for the full value of any such
asset so concealed. Specifically, defendant acknowledges,
confinns and represents, as an inducement in causing
plaintiff to execute this Agreement, that this Agreement
discloses all of the holdings and assets of defendant and
that he owns no substantial assets not herein specified.
E. Minor variations in the balances in checking and
savings and loan accounts, computations of interest accrued or accruing, but yet unpaid, values of stock, or
other personal property which is the subject of this
Agreement, shall not affect the enforceability of this
Agreement.
F. The parties heretofore, before the execution of
this Agreement, physically divided and took into their
respective personal possession all tangible chattles in
which either party hereto has any interest or in which the
parties have agreed to a division of their interests and
which are not hereinabove specifically referred to, and
each party does hereby quitclaim to the other party his
interest in and to the tangible chattles now in the possession of the other party, and each party shall retain
all of the personal property that is in the possession of
either of them as his or her sole and separate property,
as the case may be.
G. It is hereby agreed and understood that each
party hereto shall pay and be liable for his or her own
costs and attorneys' fees in connection with the divorce
action on file herein and any agreements, conveyances

13

and/or other transactions pursuant thereto or in connPetion therewith.
H. Each party to this Agreement herewith solemnly
and specifically avers that the foregoing Agreement has
been entered into without influence, fraud, coercion or
misrepresentation.

IV

INCORPORATION OF AGREEMENT IN DECREE

Upon the granting by the court of a divorce to the
plaintiff herein, it is agreed that the provisions of this
Agreement shall constitute a stipulation and shall he
incorporated by reference into the final decree of the
court.

v

AGREEMENT CONCERNING INCOME TAX
DEFICIENCIES

In the event any Federal or State income taxes are
asserted against the parties, or either of them for the
calendar year 1966, or preceding years, the defendant
will pay such deficiencies for said years as either or both
of the parties are legally obligated to pay.
17

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said parties hereto,
after consultation with their respective counsel relative
to the matter herein set forth and agreed upon, having
been advised fully and fairly as to all of the facts and
circumstances herein set forth, have hereunto set their
hands and seals this 16 day of May, 1967.
s/ Lee C. Felt
s/ Robert S. Felt

14

COUNSELS' AP PROV AL OF PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The tmdersigned being counsel for the plaintiff and
defendant named above do hereby acknowledge and confirm their approval of the Property Settlement Agreement contained above.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of May,
1967.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Counsel for Plaintiff
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Counsel for Defendant
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967.

(Title of Court and Cause)
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE, CONSENT AND
WAIVER
DEFENDANT, ROBERT S. FELT, by and through
his attorney, Grant C. Aadnesen, hereby enters his appearance in the above entitled matter and acknowledges,
consents and waives as follows:
1. Acknowledges receipt of the Complaint filed in
this action and acknowledges and affirms that certain
Property Settlement Agreement made and entered into
by and between the parties hereto.

15

2. Consents to the waiver of the statutory waiting
period of ninety (90) days otherwise provided for under
the laws of the State of Utah, and joins in the Motion
of the Plaintiff to the Court requesting the same.

19

3. Consents to the hearing of said divorce proceedings forthwith and upon the merits and to the entry of
a divorce in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, both in accordance with the terms of the Complaint and in accordance with the terms of the Property
Settlement e.s such amends said Complaint.
May 16, 1967.
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Counsel for Defendant
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967.

(Title of Court and Cause)
CONSENT AND WAIVER
20

Plaintiff, LEE C. FELT, a/k/a LEE CRAIG FELT,
by and through her attorneys, VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy, by Thomas M. Burton, hereby consents and
waives as follows :
1. Consents to the waiver of the statutory waiting
period of ninety (90) days otherwise provided for by
the laws of the State of Utah.

2. Consents to the hearing of said divorce proceedings forthwith and upon the merits and to the entry of
a divorce in favor of the Plaintaiff and aganist the De16

fendant, and to the division and settlement of the properties and assets of the parties and to the payment of alimony in accordance with the terms of that certain Property Settlement Agreement on file herein.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967.

(Title of Court and Cause)
STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER
It is hereby stipulated by the parties through their
respective counsel and in accordance with a medical
opinion attached hereto and made a part hereof, that the
ninety (90) day waiting period required under Utah law
may be waived and that the divorce proceedings herein
may be heard forthwith and upon the merits.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Attorney for Defendant
MOTION
Upon stipulation and good cause appearing, Plaintiff hereby moves the Court for an order waiving the
ninety (90) day waiting period for hearing of the cause

17

on the merits and entry of a decreP. Tn support of this
Motion, counsel represents to the Court as follows, to-wit:
1. Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed in writing
to a division and settlement regarding their joint, mutual
and individual rights in and to all properties and assets
of the parties.
2. The complaint of Plaintiff herein has not been
answered by Defendant, thereby rendering uncontested
the grounds upon which Plaintiff has brought her action
for divorce.
3. The Plaintiff and Defendant have each executed
and filed with the Court a consent to the request contained
in this Motion and a waiver of said nint>ty (90) day waiting period.
4. Plaintiff and Defendant have bt>en and presently
are represented by counsel.
5. Plaintiff and Defendant do not have any children
born of the union of said marriage.

23

6. As is more particularly evidenced by the statement of Plaintiff's doctor, which is attached to this Motion and submitted herewith, the Plaintiff has been suffering and continues to suffer serious health problt>ms
as a result of the emotional involvements and disturbances connected with the divorce matters and proceedings
herein and the Plaintiff's health will be impaired by
'
awaiting the elapse of the ninety (90) day waiting period.
Dated this 17th day of May, 1967.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff

18

ORDER
Upon stipulation and motion duly made and good
cause appearing therefor and the parties respectively
having filed herein their written consent to waiver the
ninety (90) day waiting period, the Court, being satisfied
that no good purpose shall be served in awaiting the
elapse of said waiting period and that such may cause
irreparable harm to the Plaintiff.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that the hearing in this cause may proceed forthwith and
that the customary ninety (90) day waiting period be
and the same is hereby waived.
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967.
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967.

( 'ritle of Court and Cause)
DECREE
'l'HIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, on the 17th
day of May, 19G7. The Plaintiff appeared in person and
b~· her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, of the firm VanCott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Defendant has been
served with a Summons herein and filed herein his written entry of appearance, but did not file answer to the
complaint or other pleadings, and his default was duly
<>ntered according to law. Each of the parties filed a
19
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written consent to the waiver of the usual ninety (90) day
waiting period for the entry of a decree and said ninety
(90) day waiting period was waived by the Court for
good cause shown. The parties have filed herein their
written Property Settlement Agreement. The cause has
been submitted to and considered by the Court and the
Court being fully advised in the premises and having
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE.BY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Lee C.
Felt, a/k/a Lee Craig Felt, be and she is hereby granted a
Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant, said decree to
become final and absolute upon the expiration of three
(3) months from date hereof, and that Plaintiff be and
is hereby awarded certain real and personal property
and also the sum of $1,000.00 alimony payable monthly,
pursuant to and as provided by the terms of that certain
Property Settlement Agreement entered into by and
between the parties herein, and by this reference incorporated herein as is fully and completely set forth, which
Property Settlement Agreement the Court hereby adopts
as fair and reasonable.
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967.
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967.

20

(Title of Court and Cause)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

2i

28

THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, on the 17th
day of May, 1967. The Plaintiff appeared in person and
by her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, of the firm Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Defendant
has been served with a Summons herein and filed herein
his written entry of appearance, but did not file answer
to the complaint or other pleadings, and his default was
duly entered according to law. Each of the parties filed
a written consent to the waiver of the usual (90) day
waiting period for the entry of a decree and said ninety
(90) day waiting period was waived by the Court for
good cause shown. The parties have filed herein their
written Property Settlement Agreement. The cause has
been submitted to and considered by the Court and the
Court being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide and actual
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and have been for
more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.

2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife,
having been married at Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about
the 17th day of September, 1949. There have been no
children born as issue of said marriage.

21

3. During the past several months the Defendant
has treated the Plaintiff in a cruel manner, to the extent
of causing her great mental distress.
4. The customary ninety (90) day waiting period
for the entry of a decree herein should be waived for the
reason that the continuance of the marriage during said
waiting period may result in irreparable harm to the
Plaintiff.
5. During the marriage, the parties have acquired
assets, the precise nature, extent and division of which
are contained in that certain Property Settlement Agreement between the parties, the original of which is on file
herein and by this reference incorporated herein and
made a part hereof as if fully and completely set forth.
The Court hereby finds that said Property Settleuwnt
Agreement is fair and reasonable and the same is hereby
adopted and approved by the Court.
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From the foregoing Finding of Fact, the Court makes
the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce
dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between
Plaintiff and Defendant. The properties of the parties
should be divided in accordance with that certain Property Settlement Agreement incorporated herein by reference as aforesaid, and the Plaintiff should be awarded the
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sum of $1,000.00 per month alimony as provided by the
terms of said Property Settlement Agreement.
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967.
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967.

(Title of Court and Cause)
REPOR'rER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SEEKING A DECREE
OF DIVORCE, HELD ON MAY 17, 1967, BEFORE
THE HONORABLE D. FRANK WILKINS, DISTRICT
JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT.
21±
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The record shows that Plaintiff's Complaint was
filed on April 19, 1967 and that a Consent and Waiver was
submitted by the Plaintiff wherein she consented that the
matter be heard prior to the expiration of the 90-day waiting period. There was a Stipulation and Motion filed and
an Entry of Appearance, Consent and Waiver for the Defendant by and through his attorney, whereby the Defendant acknowledged receipt of the Complaint and consented
that the 90-day period be waived if the Court granted
Plaintiff's motion and consented to hearing the matter
without further notice to him.
Mrs. Lee C. Felt, the Plaintiff, was presented to the
Court b~' her attorney. Reference was made by the Court
to Plaintiff's motion to shorten the 90-day waiting period
for hearing the matter on the grounds that delay would
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cause the Plaintiff additional physical and emotional disturbance. The Plaintiff testified that she agreed with her
doctor's report to the effect that waiver of the 90-day
waiting period would alleviate some of the physical and
emotional disturbance from which she had been suffering.
Plaintiff's motion to shorten the 90-day period was
granted and the default of the Defendant was entered
on the basis of the pleadings previously filed.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
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Mrs. Lee C. Felt testified that she was the Plaintiff
m the divorce action on file, that she was married to
Robert S. Felt, the Defendant, on September 17, 1949, and
that she and her husband had been bona fide residents of
Salt Lake County, Utah, for more than three months
immediately preceding the divorce action. No children
had been born of the marriage. Mrs. Felt declared that
her husband had treated her in a cruel manner causing
her great mental distress during the past several months.
She stated her husband had indicated he no longer loved
her, that he remained absent from their home for substantial periods of time, that he came in late without suitable explanation, and that he was constantly critical of
her and her household management.
During their marriage, Mrs. Felt had been employed
all but two years and was the main source of income for
the first seven years while her husband was completing
his medical training. Mrs. Felt stated that she was
familiar with a document entitled, "Property Settlement
Agreement" which she had read, consulted counsel about
24

and signed. She testified that she was familiar with her
husband's signature and that the same appeared on page
13 of said Agreement. The Agreement was offered and
received by the Court as part of the file in the matter.
Mrs. Felt was satisfied with the division of assets set
forth in the Agreement and felt the same to be fair and
reasonable. She also felt that the provision in said Agreement which specified an alimony payment of $1,000.00 per
month was reasonable and agreed with all other aspects
of said Agreement.
In response to questions by the Court, it was the
opinion of Plaintiff and her counsel that after division of
the assets pursuant to said Agreement, each party would
receive between $10,000 and $15,000. The Court asked
if there was any cut-off date on the alimony, to which
Plaintiff's counsel replied that the alimony payments
would only terminate in the event of Plaintiff's death
or remarriage or if the Defendant was unable because
of some change of circumstances to earn the type of
money he is now earning. It was stated by Plaintiff's
counsel that the Defendant had gross income in the neighborhood of $60,000.00 in 1966. Mrs. Felt commented that
Defendant's gross income was more than that and her
counsel agreed.
The Court asked Mrs. Felt if she worked now and if
she intended to work, to which she replied, "I work part
time. I do radio and TV commercials part time, and I hope
to work again." The Court responded, "That wouldn't
surprise me ... So you can supplement your income, this
one thousand, to some extent~" Mrs. Felt answered
"Yes."
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The Plaintiff then stated that she did not condone
the actions of her husband in staying away for periods
of time and that they had never had marriage counseling.
She did not feel that marriage counseling would be of help
in this matter if ordered.
The divorce was then granted to the Plaintiff according to the prayer of the Complaint except where the
prayer was modified by the Property Settlement Agre€ment which was on file and approved by the Court.
BETH N. RENSHAW
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
Duly certified November 17, 1970 and filed December 3,
1970.

(Title of Court and Cause)
PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.
33

Petitioner respectfully represents unto the court and
petitions as follows:
On or about the 17th day of May, 1967, the court
herein awarded to the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, a/k/a Lee
Craig Felt, a divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony
existing between plaintiff and defendant and ordering
the division of real and personal property pursuant to the
terms of that certain Property Settlement Agreement
entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defend1.
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ant on the 16th day of May, 1967, and specifically approved by the court herein and incorporated in the Decree
by reference. Paragraph II of said Settlement Agreement contains the following provisions regarding alimony
payable by the defendant to the plaintiff:
A. Robert S. Felt hereby agrees to pay
$500.00 to the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, upon the execution of this instrument, and thereafter to pay to
the plaintiff Lee C. Felt, as permanent alimony,
the sum of $1,000 per month, payable each and
every month on or before the first day of the
month, commencing on June 1, 1967.
2. Defendant has without explanation failed and
refused to make said payments of $1,000 per month as a
result of which there is presently past due and owing to
plaintiff under the terms of said Decree the amount of
$3,100.
3. It has been necessary for plaintiff to employ
counsel to prosecute this petition and a reasonable sum
for the services of said attorneys is $100.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that an order be
entered requiring the defendant to show cause, if any he
has, why judgment should not be entered against him
in the amount of $3,100 due under the terms of said
Decree and, if the same is not paid forthwith, to show
cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt
of court, and that said order further provide for payment
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by defendant to plaintiff of the sum of $100 attorney's
.
fees and petitioner's costs incurred herein.
DATED this 7th day of October, 1969.
s/ Lee C. Felt
Petitioner
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORWNALL & McCARTHY
Attorney for Petitioner
Duly verified and filed October 8, 1969.

(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
30

BASED UPON the verified petition of the plaintiff
herein, a copy of which is attached hereto, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant,
Robert S. Felt, be and appear before the Honorable Emmett L. Brown, one of the Judges of the above-entitled
court, at room 1, New Courts Building, 240 East 4th
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 21st day of October
1969, at 10 :00 o'clock a.m. then and there to show cause,
if any he has, why judgment should not be entered against
the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of
$3,100 together with interest thereon, attorney's fees in
the sum of $100 and costs of this proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant appear at said time and place to show cause, if any he has,
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why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing
to abide by the terms of the Decree entered in the aboveentitled cause on the 17th day of May, 1967.
ii

MADE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October,
1969.
EMMETT L. BROWN, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed October 14, 1969.

(Title of Court and Cause)
MOTION TO AMEND DIVORCE DECREE AND
NOTICE
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MOTION
Based on the file herein and the Affidavit attached
and documents and evidence that will be obtained by discovery and presented herein, defendant moves the court
for an Order eliminating alimony herein and terminating
plaintiff's rights to maintain life insurace policies on defendant's life, and to amend the divorce decree herein accordingly.
DATED this 13th day of November, 1969.
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Attorney for Defendant
Duly verified and filed November 14, 1969.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT S. FELT
43

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ROBERT S. FE.LT, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says that he is the defendant in the above named action and that the Divorce Decree in the above named
action should be altered to substantially reduce alimony
now set at $1,000.00 per month or to eliminate the same
for the following reasons :
1. At the time of the Divorce Decree herein, defendant was prevailed upon by plaintiff and counsel-both
her's and his - and urged to consent to an alimony decree
which he was persuaded he could maintain and that was
fair under the circumstances, however circumstances
since, including his health conditions, have demonstrated
that it is not only impossible for him to maintain such an
amount of alimony but that the same was unreasonable
and unfair at the time and at the present time is not
only unfair and unreasonable but impossible.

2. Since said Divorce Decree the defendant has remarried and now has two additional dependents: his wife
and a child.
3. The work load necessary to maintain in order to
make the payments in question is professionally inadvisable and unwise and impossible from the standpoint of
defendant's mental and physical health.
30

4. Since the date
defendant's income is
same, however costs of
of various kinds, and
creased.

of said divorce in May, 1967, the
either less or approximately the
doing business, professional costs
living costs have drastically in-

5. Defendant has substantial indebtedness and has
not been able to reduce the same since said divorce and
this principally because of said enormous alimony payments.
'1

6. The plaintiff, on the other hand, at the time of
the said divorce was employed only part time with modest
income, however she has, since said time, become fully
employed with part time fees and income in addition to
full time employment.
7. Furthermore, the plaintiff has substantial stock
and investments including substantial amounts of blue
chip securities-for instance, Hercules Powder Company,
CTS Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, National Air
Lines, Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, Putnam
Growth Fund Stock, Star Broadcasting Company stock
and other stocks in addition to stock purchased since said
divorce; also plaintiff realized in the divorce settlement
substantial cash, personal property and automobile, etc.
8. The plaintiff is in good health, employed and
employable and, in good conscience, from any standpoint,
ought no longer to be dependent upon the defendant for
any portion of her livelihood. The plaintiff has a masters
degree in speech and a minor college degreti in English
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and is well qualified to earn a substantial livelihood in a
variety of different fields.
9. At the time of the said divorce the defendant
was prevailed upon to allow the continuance upon his life
for plaintiff's benefit, of two life insurance policies and,
whether or not there was reason at the time of said
divorce for the maintenance of such insurance for the
benefit of plaintiff, at the present time there is no reason
whatsoever, in law or justice, to allow the maintenance
and continuance of said life insurance policies.
DATED this 15 day of November, 1969.
s/ Robert S. Felt
Duly verified and filed November 19, 1969.

(Title of Court and Cause)
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT
53

COMES NOW the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, a/k/a Lee
Craig Felt, and being first duly sworn, deposes and replies to defendant's Affidavit filed herein in support of
Motion to Amend Divorce Decree as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendant's Affidavit fails to state any ground upon
which modification of the Decree herein could be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE

).J:

The defendant agreed upon and the court approved
as fair and reasonable alimony of $1,000 per month in
consideration of the efforts made by the plaintiff in assisting the defendant in his professional education, and in
view of the circumstances and social standing of the plaintiff. The agreement was signed and the Decree was entered in contemplation of the likelihood of future employment by the plaintiff and with knowledge of her
education, training, experience and ability and accordingly, the same do provide that said alimony should not
thereafter be adjusted, notwithstanding increases or decreases in any amount in the income of plaintiff, and notwithstanding any changes in the income of the defendant
unless said changes were substantial and so decreased
the defendant's income as to render him reasonably unable to pay said alimony.
THIRD DEFENSE.
1. Denies each and every statement contained in
paragraph 1. Defendant is a highly educated, trained and
experienced physician. Both defendant and his counsel
read and approved the Property Settlement Agreement
on May 16, 1967, as evidenced by their signatures affixed
in witness thereof. On May 17, 1967, the Honorable D.
Frank Wilkins, judge of the above-entitled court, entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree incorporating therein said Property Settlement Agreement and approving the same as fair and reasonable. Defendant's health is in no manner substantially or per33

manently impaired so as to render it impossible or substantially more difficult for defendant to maintain the
alimony payments as decreed.
2. Plaintiff admits that defendant has remarried
since the entry of said decree but denies each and every
other statement contained in paragraph 2 of defendant's
Affidavit.
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3.

Denies paragraph 3 of defendant's Affidavit.

4. Admits that since May 1967 the cost of living
has increased, because of which the alimony amounts
should not be reduced. Plaintiff denies each and every
other statement contained in paragraph 4.
5.

Denies paragraph 5 of defendant's Affidavit.

6.

Admits paragraph 6 of defendant's Affidavit.

7. Replying to paragraph 7, plaintiff received certain personal property pursuant to and as enumerated
in said Property Settlement Agreement and has thereafter purchased further items of personal property.
Plaintiff denies that she has substantial stock or investments.
8. Replying to paragraph 8, plaintiff admits that
she has educational degrees as stated, is in good health,
and employed, but denies each and every other statement
therein contained.
9. Replying to paragraph 9, plaintiff admits that
she is the beneficiary of two insurance policies on the
defendant's life but denies each and every other state34

ment therein contained. As to said policies, plaintiff has
paid since said Decree and now does pay the premiums.
DATED this 21st day of November, 1969.
s/LEE C. FELT
Duly verified and filed November 21, 1969.

(Title of Court and Cause)
JUDGMENT
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, judge, on
the 2nd day of December, 1969, pursuant to an Order to
Show Cause on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appeared by her attorney Thomas M. Burton and the defendant appeared by his attorney Gayle Dean Hunt. Upon
stipulation of the parties and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded judgment against the defendant in the sum of $4,600.00
for unpaid alimony pursuant to Decree herein computed
through the month of December, 1969, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 8 percent from date hereof, and for
the further sum of $100.00 attorney's fees, plus her
costs incurred.
DATED this 9th day of December, 1969.
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed December 9, 1969.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
Respodent's attorney filed a short brief with the
court setting forth arguments in support of modification
of the alimony decree. These arguments are not summarized herein as they will most likely be contained in
Respondent's brief in this matter.
Filed January 23, 1970.

(Title of Court and Cause)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
BY PLAINTIFF FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Appellant filed the captioned Memorandum setting
forth arguments in opposition to Respondent's motion to
modify the alimony decree. These arguments are not reproduced here as they will be contained in Appellant's
brief.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorney for Plaintiff
Filed January 23, 1970.

36

(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

136

BASED UPON the verified petition of the plaintiff
herein, a copy of which is attached hereto, and good
cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant
Robert S. Felt be and appear before the Honorable
Emmett L. Brown, one of the Judges of the above-entitled
Court, New Courts Building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of August, 1970, at 9 :00
o'clock a.m., then and there to show cause, if any he has,
why judgment should not be entered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $8,000.00
together with interest thereon, attorney's fees in the
sum of $250.00 and costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant
appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not
be found in contempt for failing to abide by the terms of
the decree entered in thf' above-entitled cause on the 17th
day of May, 1967, and the judgment entered in the aboveentitled cause on the 9th day of December, 1969.
MADE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1970.
EMMETT L. BROWN, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed July 30, 1970.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
JUDGMENT
139

rrhe above entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, on
the 6th day of August, 1970, pursuant to an Order to
Show Cause on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff ap.
peared with her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, and the
defendant appeared with his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt.
Evidence was offered on behalf of the parties and the
court having heard argument and being fully advised in
the premises,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to Decree
herein, the plaintiff be and she is awarded judgment
against defendant in the sum of $8,000.00 for unpaid alimony from January 1, 1970 through August 31, 1970, with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 8% from date hereof,
and her costs incurred.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1970.
GORDON R. HALL, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed August 18, 1970.

(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER
182

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Order to Show
Cause why defendant should not be found in contempt of
court for failure to pay alimony to plaintiff from and
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after January 1, 1970, is here by continued until Thursday, October 1, 1970, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m., at
which time said matter shall be further heard and considered by the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Modify Divorce Decree is hereby set for hearing on
Thursday, October 1, 1970, at the hour of 2 :30 o'clock
p.m.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1970.
GORDONR. HALL, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed August 18, 1970.

('l'itle of Court and Cause)
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
ON PLAINTIFF'S ORDER T 0 SH 0 W
CAUSE WHY THE DEFENDANT SHOULD
NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND DIVORCE DECREE RESPECTING ALIMONY
PAYMENTS, HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE GORDON R. HALL, A JUDGE OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ON THE lST
DAY OF OCTOBER, 1970.
227

The case for hearing before the court was Case Number 171633, LEE C. FELT, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT S.
FELT Defendant. Mr. Thomas M. Burton represented
'
the plaintiff, and Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt acted as counsel
for the defendant.
39

OPENING STATEMENTS
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Mr. Hunt stated that he intended for the hearing to
be a broad examination into the file back to and including
the Divorce Decree and Property Settlement Agreement.
He said that he did not intend the court to be confined
to the matter of whether there had been a change of circumstances on the part of either party, but intended and
hoped to show that the decree itself prescribed an unreasonable burden on the defendant and was basically
unfair and founded upon erroneous premises that should
be examined. Mr. Burton objected to the scope of Mr.
Hunt's statement on the grounds of irrelevancy and immateriality and of res judicata. He argued that the decree on its face was signed by Dr. Felt and was approved
by the court as to its form and fairness, both in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in the decree
itself. The objection was specifically directed to any
attempt to broaden the preceding into an inquiry into the
basic fairness of the Divorce Decree itself.
In response to a question by the court, Mr. Hunt answered that there was originally a written stipulation
of the parties termed "Property Settlelment Agreemt>nt"
upon which the Divorce Decree was based. The conrt
indicated it was not going to unnecessarily restrict Mr.
Hunt in the proceeding. It was admitted by the conrt that
it had some reservations about whether the scope of the
hearing could be as broad as indicated in Mr. Hunt's
opening remarks since there vvas a written stipulation in
the matter which had been adopted and approved by the
court.
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The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, was examined directly by
Mr. Burton and cross-examined by Mr. Hunt on matters
pertaining to the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause Why
the Defendant Should Not be held in Contempt. Robert
S. Felt, the defendant, and Marge Kiddle were directly
examined by Mr. Burton in regard to the same issue.
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF LEE CRAIG FELT
BY MR. HUNT
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The plaintiff testified that she was presently single
and employed full time by Circuit & Eddington Advertising. Mr. Hunt asked plaintiff her present salary and
Mr. Burton objected on the grounds of irrelevancy. He
declared that the plaintiff and defendant had agreed to
the Property Settlelment Agreement which had been
adopted and incorporated into the Divorce Decree. Said
agreement provided that no change in Mrs. Felt's income
or circumstances would have any bearing on the obligation of the defendant to make alimony payments. The
court ref erred to the Property Settlement Agreement
mentioned by Mr. Burton which allowed the plaintiff's
income to fluctuate without affecting defendant's obligation. Discussion between Mr. Hunt, Mr. Burton and the
court followed as to whether an inquiry into the plaintiff's salary was proper. Mr. Hunt argued that Judge
Wilkins had permitted discovery of the plaintiff's salary
and Mr. Burton contended that although discovery may
have been permitted, that did not necessarily mean the
information obtained therefrom could be admitted as
evidence. Mr. Hunt asserted that the Utah Supreme
Court case of Callister v. Callister and others permitted
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the court to increase or decrease alimony payments upon
a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. Mr.
Burton countered by stating that the cases did not
apply where a Decree and Property Settlement Agreement had been entered into in contemplation of the wife's
future employment. At the time of this hearing, the
transcript of the divorce proceeding before Judge Wilkins had been lost by the reporter in the move from the
old courthouse building to the new. Efforts were being
made to locate the same and have the reporter's notes
transcribed. The court overruled Mr. Burton's objection
and allowed Mr. Hunt to proceed with his examination.
Mrs. Felt stated that at the time of the divorce in
the Spring of 1967, she was employed part-time doing
free lance talent work. At the date of the present hearing,
she was employed full time by Circuit & Eddington at a
salary of approximately $8,400.00 per year. In addition
to her full time employment, Mrs. Felt engaged in some
part-time free lance work and had done so for the past
year. Furthermore, Mrs. Felt occasionally read a cornmercial for radio station KSXX which resulted in some
income. Her income from stocks and bonds amounted to
$100.00 a year or less.
Mrs. Felt declared that she possessed a l\faster's Degree and Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University
and had extensive training in the radio and TV field. She
further stated that she was able to earn a livelihood and
was trying hard to earn enough money to secure her
future and, therefore had chosen to work. The plaintiff
responded that she was in good health for a -..voman of
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age 431/2 and had been able to hold a good skilled job.
She expressed a concern that her employment may not
be secure in the future in view of the fact that her employer had recently hired a number of young people and
had put an emphasis on young people with new ideas.
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No dependents were reported by Mrs. Felt on her
income tax returns. In addition to her salary, her employer furnished some medical coverage by paying onehalf the cost of Blue Cross-Blue Shield Medical Insurance. The employer also provided two weeks of paid
vacation and furnished a membership in the Advertising
Club. Mrs. Felt owned her own furniture and was purchasing an annuity from the Pollack Fund. Mrs. Felt
stated that she had savings account, various charge and
credit accounts, that her clothing costs approximated
$800.00 a year, that her apartment rental was $178.00 a
month, that she spent round $110.00 a month for food,
that her utilities were paid, that she spent $35.00 a month
on life insurance, spent $5.00 to $10.00 a month for recreation, $3.00 a month for membership in the American
Women Radio and Television Society, and incurred medical and dental expenses of $25.00 per month. She admitted the she was not really living high in view of her personal living expenses.
The plaintiff's 1968 Income Tax Return showed income from wages and salaries of $8,091.00 and other income of $12,078.00, which included the $1,000.00 a month
alimony payments received from her husband. Her total
income for the year 1968 before taxes amounted to $20,968.00.
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Mrs. Felt's 1969 Income Tax Return showed a total
income of $17,168.00 with an adjustment of $1,800.00, leaving an adjuS'ted gross income of $15,000.00. During the
year 1969, Dr. Felt had paid only part of his alimony obligation. It was admitted that without any alimony from
Dr. Felt, Mrs. Felt would earn in the neighborhood of
$8,500.00 or $8,600.00 a year. Mr. Burton again objected
to the line of questioning concerning the plaintiff's income and expenses, which objection was overruled by the
court.
The only borrowing engaged in by Mrs. Felt was
borrowing on her Walker Bank Card. No vacations had
been taken by the plaintiff although she had made several
trips in connection with work to Las Vegas, Michigan,
Arizona and Los Angeles, plus a week-end conference
in Denver. Mr. Hunt questioned the plaintiff whether
she chose to work voluntarily, to which she responded,
"yes," that she worked at her particular job to earn a
living. She stated that if she had no financial stress to
consider, she would quit her current job and find one
she liked better and only work part-time. It was further
stated bv
. Mrs. Felt that she did not have any. savings
and did not have the same opportunity to increase her
earnings she would have if younger. Therefore, she chose
to work to provide for some kind of security in the evE'nt
of an accident or unemployment for some period of time.
Mrs. Felt further stated that she desired to provide
for her own retirement and, therefore, wanted to work as
hard as she could to try and earn something for retirement vears and to provide for herself in the case of sick-
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ness. She admitted that at present she was in vigorous
health, fully employed and capable of earning a living
from day to day if nothing went wrong. Plaintiff declared that she did not want to eliminate the alimony
payments until such time as she was sick or unemployed,
because at such time Dr. Felt may also be sick or unemployed. She did not feel that the $1,000.00 a month
which had been agreed upon by her husband and herself
was unreasonable or unfair in light of his earnings and
the after tax cost of making such payments. It was stated
Mrs. Felt did not like to receive alimony and wished that
she did not have to, but that such alimony payments were
accepted because she needed the money to pro'Vi.de for her
future.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
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The plaintiff testified that she married Dr. Felt in
December of 1949 and that at the time of said marriage
she was employed part-time and completing college. Follo,ving Dr. Felt's graduation from Medical School, he
went to Detroit, Michigan for his internship. Mrs. Felt
stayed in Salt Lake City for three months and worked
at two full time jobs. At the end of three months she
joined her husband in Detroit for the remaining period
of his internship and was employed full time in Detroit,
Michigan.
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Upon completion of the internship, the plaintiff and
the defendant moved to Denver, Colorado, where Dr. Felt
completed his residency period of three years training.
During the three year residency in Colorado, Mrs. Felt
45

was employed full time, being a teacher at the Colorado
Women's College, a Secretary to the Dean of Women for
a year, and then the Continuity Director for KFEL TV.
Mrs. Felt earned an amount of salary equal to or in excess of the money earned by Dr. Felt during the period
of internship and residency.
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Upon completion of his residency, Dr. Felt entered
the Armed Forces for a period of two years. During
said period, Mrs. Felt did not work. After completion of
his service time, Dr. Felt and the plaintiff moved to Salt
Lake City where Dr. Felt was employed in his specialty.
Mrs. Felt worked full time for approximatelty 211z years
after they returned to Salt Lake City and was employed
part-time for another seven years. Mrs. Felt testified
that she worked until approximately the time of the divorce. She further said that at the time of the divorce
she contemplated returning to full time employment
thereafter. No discussions were had between Dr. and
Mrs. Felt after she left home in 1967 regarding employment but Mrs. Felt again returned to full time employment about four months later.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

325

Mrs. Felt was asked whether the work pattern that
she had followed existed before the time of the divorce,
to which she answered yes. She further testified that at
the time of her marriage to Dr. Felt, he was within one
quarter of graduating from Medical School. Dr. Felt had
not, hovveyer, completed his internship or residency.
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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ROBERTS. FELT
BY MR. HUNT
3~4

325
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The defendant was questioned concerning his income
during the period of internship and residency and asked
why he signed the Property Settlement Agreement which
provided that the alimony payments were being made "in
view of the efforts made by plaintiff in assistance of defendant in his professional education." Mr. Burton objected to the question on the grounds that the question
was entering the area of impeaching the court's divorce
decree which had been agreed to, read, understood and
approved by the defendant, his counsel, and the court.
He stated that said agreement had been incorporated into
the decree and was part and parcel of the decree. Mr.
Burton further argued that he had previously stated
his objection to the defendant's attempt to go behind the
face of the decree and impeach it by saying he didn't
understand the terms or that he was under duress. The
court indicated that it intended to be flexible about this
matter. The court stated that it fully apprecitaed Mr.
Burton's position and admitted that he may very well
be right, however, his objection was overruled without
prejudice and Mr. Hunt was allowed to continue.

In response to Mr. Hunt's question, Dr. Felt testified
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that the reason he signed the Property Settlelment Agreement was he was under such mental and physical duress
that he did not contest the agreement as being in fact the
best that his counsel could secure. Defendant stated that
he questioned the alimony payment provision of the
agreement along with other provisions but was told by
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his counsel that this was proper and that he should sign
it. The Property Settlement Agreement was signed by
Dr. Felt at his home ·with only his counsel present. He
declared that he had never seen the agreement prior to
the time that he signed it and that he spent only approximately ten minutes in reviewing said agreement. Defendant commented that he executed the agreemt>nt the first
and only time that he saw it.
Defendant declared that m his opm10n it was impossible to maintain the alimony paymPnts of $1,000.00
per month because his circumstances had changed considerably and that he had rmiarried. He stated that he
managed to maintain the alimony payments as long as
he could during 1968 but it became physically and mentally impossible to maintain the burden on himself or his
patients. The overhead costs and business costs associated with his practice were stated to be on the inflationary rise although his fee structure had remained the same.
In the latter part of 1967 and the early part of 1968, Dr.
Felt said he was forced to rnsh through more people,
work long and demanding hours and undertake a heavier
surgical schedule in order to meet the alimony payments.
Because of the increased work load, Dr. Felt claimed to
have become increasingly tired ph)'Sically and to have
developed some neurological problems. He consulted
doctors concerning the neurological problems and was
told that he should cut down on his work. Dr. Felt further stated that he thought it was professionally inadvisable to undertake tlH• work load he had in 19GS and
1969.
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Dr. Felt next testified concerning changes which had
occurred in his income and expenses for the· years 1967,
1968, and 1968. Defendant's Exhibit 14-D was admitted
into evidence and the defendant was questioned as to the
information thereon. Said exhibit consisted of an accounting breakdown of the income and expenses for Dr. Felt
during the years 1967 through 1969. Said exhibit showed
gross income from medical practice of $70,108.00 in 1967,
$72,481.00 in 1968, and $67,648.00 in 1969. The expenses
for the corresponding years were $38,973.00, $38,490.00,
and $43,213.00. Adjusted gross income before taxes,
alimony payments and interest on a house loan was $34,040.00 in 1967, $38,186.00 in 1968, and $28,014.00 in 1969.
The net income figures listed in said Exhibit 14-D revealed net income in 1967 of $17,317.00, in 1968 of $17,573.00 and in 1969 of $14,395.00.
Defendant's Exhibit 15-D consisted of a graph showing defendant's net income after disbursements and alimony for the years 1966 through 1969. Said exhibit was
admitted over Mr. Burton's objection that the information was already before the court and that the manner
of graphing the information may be exaggerated. Exhibit
16-D was also admitted over Mr. Burton's objection. Said
exhibit illustrated defendant's gross overhead costs excluding alimony for the years 1964 through 1969. As
graphed, the exhibit indicated an increase in gross overhead costs from $19,500.00 in 1964, to $49,000.00 in 1969.
Exhibit 17-D was admitted into evidence, said exhibit
purporting to show the costs of post-graduate meetings,
seminars and conventions and the number attended by
Dr. Felt each year. Said graph indicated that Dr. Felt
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attended approximtaely five to six such seminars per
year and that the cost had increased somevvhat over the
years. Dr. Felt then commented upon the increase in personal living expenses he had experienced since 1967. The
court took judicial notice of the fact that the cost of living
has increased during the past years. Exhibit 22-D was admitted to evidence over plaintiff's objection, said exhibit
indicating that the estimated living expenses of Dr. Felt
were $1,604.44 per month.
CROSS EXAMINATION
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Dr. Felt admitted that during the period of his residency and internship Mrs. Felt was employed and the
money she earned was not placed in a separate fund hut
that all earnings were kept in the kitty and both lived off
the mone.'r in the kitty. The defendant also stated that at
the time he married his present wife, Mrs. Verla Felt,
that he was fully aware of the obligation he had agreed
to perfonn of paying $1,000.00 per month to l\frs. Lee C.
Felt as alimony.
Mr. Burton questioned the defendant in regard to
the expenses for attending conventions over the years
1967 through 1969. The graph admitted to evidence as
Exhibit 17-D, showed a drop in the expenditures for convention attendance in the vPar 19()7 although the total
number of meetings attended each year remained about
the same. Dr. Felt stated that the drop in Pxpenditnres
may be attributable to the conventions themselves costing
less or being held closer to Salt Lake City. Mr. Burton
next questioned Dr. Felt regarding the breakdown in ex50
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penses listed on Exhibit 14-D. One of the expenses listed
as a decduction from gross income was referred to as
Keogh. In 1967 there was no deduction, in 1968 $1,500.00
was deducted, and in 1969 $2,500.00 was deducted from
gross income. Dr. Felt admitted that the Keogh account
is to provide for his retirement and that in effect he was
paying himself an amount for later use. Under such circumstances, the defendant admitted he did not know
whether the Keogh contributions were a proper deduction from gross income.
It was admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff
had been employed off and on full and sometimes parttime during the entire years of their marriage. He stated
that he assumed she worked because she enjoyed it and
that even after he was established as a specialist in Salt
Lake City, she still worked occasionally. Dr. Felt commented that he didn't know whether the plaintiff anticipated working after the divorce. He stated that he never
specifically discussed this with the plaintiff and did not
recall discussing it with his counsel.

Defendant admitted signing the Property Settlement
Agreement which was incorporated into the divorce decree on May 17, 1967. At the time of his signing said
Property Settlement Agreement, Mr. Grant Aadnesen
was declared to be his counsel of his own free choosing.
Said counsel had not been suggested to Dr. Felt by the
plaintiff or any person connected with her. Defendant
further responded that to his knowledge his counsel had
held several discussions with counsel representing plaintiff. He then admitted that he had discussions on more
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than one occasion with Mr. Aadnesen, his counsel, concerning conversations which Mr. Aadnesen had had with
plaintiff's counsel.
The defendant declared that he received phone calls
from his counsel with reference to possible settlement
aspects of the case. He testified that he couldn't recall
the exact conversations regarding settlement, only that
when settlement had been reached he was notified by Mr.
Aadnesen that he would be up to the house to show him
the settlement. Concerning the amount of alimony, Dr.
Felt admitted the only amount of alimony ever discussed
was $1,000.00 per month.
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Mr. Burton referred to paragraph one of defendant's
affidavit which had been filed with the court in support
of his motion to amend the divorce decree. Said affidavit
set forth as a ground for modification that defendant
had been prevailed upon by plaintiff and counsel, both
hers and his, and urged to consent to an alimony decision
which he was persuaded he could maintain and that was
fair under the circumstances. Mr. Burton asked the defendant what he meant by prevailed upon, to which
he replied he was approached by Mr. Aadnesen after Mr.
Aadnesen had held discussions with plaintiff's counsel
concerning the possibility of settlement. The defendant
stated that hy prevailed upon he meant that he was requested to consent to the details of the Property SettlPment Agreement which he signed. It was admitted that
the request made by Mr. Aadnesen was that the details
were finally to be worked out, the document had been
dictated and transcribed in his office, was ready for
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signature, and that defendant should look it over and sign
it.

In response to the question of whether he discussed
the terms and provisions of the decree with his counsel,
Dr. Felt replied that he went through it as he had indicated in earlier testimony and questioned some of the
items. He said he questioned the alimony item as being
over generous. Mr. Aadnesen, his counsel, purportedly
said that any Third District Court Judge would agree
that this was fair and equitable and that he thought it was
too. Therefore, Dr. Felt claimed he relied upon counsel's advice because he had to, meaning that when he
questioned the alimony provision the answer was that
any other judge would have done the same. The defendant
admitted that he was not prevented from obtaining other
counsel at that time but that it had never occurred to him
to do so. He also stated that he could have sought other
advice to see if Mr. Aadnesen 's representation concerning
the alimony payment was correct but he didn't.
Mr. Burton asked whether defendant and his counsel
had discussed the possibility of the alimony amount being
greater in the event of a trial. Dr. Felt commented that
he asked his counsel whether he was to appear, if there
was going to be a judge and jury, and how this thing is
going to operate. Mr. Aadnesen allegedly replied that
in cases of this type ordinarily the attorne,ys draw up the
agreements between themselves and if they are satisfactory to their individual clients it is carried no further.
Defendant also said he questioned the propriety of the
plaintiff being immune from the court reviewing the ali53
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mony from time to time and that Mr. Aadnesen stated
that this is the way we handle it. It was admitted by defendant, however, that plaintiff was not immune, that if
his income went down she was not immune under the
terms of the agreement from having the alimony reducPd.
He also responded that if plaintiff's income \Vas reduced
the court would look at the decree and if his income increased the plaintiff had no right to have the alimony
adjusted upward.
The following exchange then occurred between Mr.
Burton and defendant:

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

vVell, at any rate, you discussed this alimony
provision with him, and at the conclusion of
your discussion you signed the agreement 1
Yes.
And you didn't in any way, suggest that ~-011
weren't a free agent, that you were compelled
to do it in this way1
No.

So you really weren't prevailed upon in any
manner to sign this agreement rather tl1an
not to sign it?
A. OnlY to the extent that that \vas the best W('
couid do, therefore, ergo, write your name.
The answer was always the same, well, there
it is.
This
was the settlement, that was the brst
Q.
settlement that could be made under the circumstances, what he represented to yon?
A. Anybody else sitting on the bench, it was the
same thing.

Q.
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You had discussed, I take it, with your counsel
the facts and circumstances of all conduct
involving you, your wife, and all the manifestations of that conduct~
A. To a degree.

Q.

Q.
A.

I see. And this agreement was all part of that
discussion in regard to the divorce wasn't it?
Yes.

'l'he defendant was then questioned concerning the
allegation in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon to
sign the Property Settlement Agreement. Reference was
made to page 4, line 3 of defendant's deposition, where
he was asked what he meant by the statement that he was
prevailed upon by plaintiff and her counsel in regard to
the Property Settlement Agreement. The defendant
admitted in his deposition that he hadn't had any contact
with the plaintiff or her counsel except in conversations
through his counsel. Again, in court, the defendant admitted that he never had any discussion with Mrs. Felt
after the divorce was filed or with the lawyers representing her. Referring to the deposition of defendant,
Mr. Burton next requested defendant to refer to page 5,
line 2, where he was asked what he meant by the statement in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon by
plaintiff and her counsel in connection with the decree.
Dr. Felt read his answer as it appeared in the deposition
which stated, "Since the language is not my own, I am
going to have to pass because I didn't write this."
Defendant next testfied concerning his present health
conditions which he claimed made it impossible for him
to maintain the alimony payments. The specific health
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problem was stated to be a depression syndrome rnsulting
in a partial paralysis of the right shoulder. The physical
abnormality was determined to be a verticulus of one of
the roots stemming out of the neck. No particular injury
or trauma could be isolated as the cause of the problem.
The physicians consulted by Dr. Felt were of the opinion
that he should curtail his work load and physical activity
in an effort to relieye the problem. Dr. Felt further admitted that the problem was not a question of emotion
but there was a physical lesion to which the syndrome
was related. It was furhter established that the syndrome
had subsided and that the defendant had no further
problems of any sort with reference to it. Dr. Felt did
state that his Doctors felt that the same problem could
occur again at any time and that he should avoid any
strenuous physical activity which ma~- cause the disc in
his neck to slip again. In spite of this recommendation by
the doctors, Dr. Felt continued to ski regularly during
the year, his justification being that he had to weigh
the risk of aggravating the health condition with the risk
of sitting around and becoming fat and degenerated.
The defendant was questioned rt>garding his mental
health and he commented that there was nothing presently
wrong with his mental health. At one time he had consulted a psychiatrist but tht> prohlE>m had been cleared
up.

REDIRECT l!JXAMINATION
387

The defendant testified that the reason for his sterilization was because of hereditary muscular dystrophy in
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his ancestry. Sterilization was accomplished about a week
or two after he married the plaintiff, Mrs. Lee Felt. He
declared that he discussed the matter of sterilization
with the plaintiff, that she was in favor of it and helped
him make the decision.
RECROSS EXAMINATION
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Defendant testified that during the five years of his
residency and internship that Mrs. Felt's salary contributed to the overall treasury. He admitted that her salary
was in excess of his while they were in Denver for his
residency. After Dr. Felt was discharged from the Air
Force he came to Salt Lake City to establish his practice.
During the first year to 2¥2 years of practice he admitted
that there were various expenses for the purchase of
equipment and to establish himself in business. The
plaintiff was employed full time throughout this period
of time.
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF LEE CRAIG FELT
BY MR. BURTON

04

05

Mrs. Felt testified that in spite of her present academic qualifications, she was unable to secure a teaching
position because she did not have a teaching certificate.
To acquire such a certficate would require her to quit
work and return to school. The plaintiff further responded that she would like to change from her present
job because of the pressure that she must work under.
Her employer required that for each 15 minute segment
of her time, the plaintiff account for something she has
57

406

407

produced which is billable to a client. Mrs. Felt admitted
that she held an executive position with her employer and
that she had seen other younger persons hired after her.
Many of the persons hired subsequent to .Mrs. Felt were
employed at a greater compensation, especially in the
case of men. She did not feel that a woman had the same
chance to become a Vice-President for her employer and
make the same money as a man. .Mrs. Felt said that she
had not actually sought other employment in Salt Lake
City because her salary was commensurate with what a
person could make at her job. She responded that she
had considered seeking employment in other cities but
that she could not afford to take the time off to travel
to other cities in search of a job.
CROSS EXAMINATION
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During the time of Mrs. Felt's employment while
married to the defendant, there were no dependents in
their home. She admitted that the cost of Dr. Felt's
attending :Medical School was paid for by his parents.
Also, Dr. Felt's parents assisted plaintiff and defendant
in the purchase of a duplex in which they resided during
their residency in Denver. Dr. Felt's parents further provided plaintiff and defendant with an automobile during
their residency.

410441

Mrs. Verla Felt, the defendant's present wife, and
Mrs. Olive S. Felt, the defendant's mother, were examined
about matters pertaining to the contempt issue which was
before the court.
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ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL
Following presentation of the foregoing testimony,
the plaintiff and defendant rested their cases. Thereupon,
the court instructed Mr. Burton to proceed with his
argument which shonld include both the question of contempt which was before the court and the question of
amending the divorce decree. Mr. Burton asserted that
under the doctrine of clean hands the defendant was not
entitled to proceed with the modification of the divorce
decree until the arrearage was made up. Mr. Hunt requested to see the law on that voint. The court stated
that it had opened the matter up and let it be fully aired
to the satisfaction of both parties. Therefore, the court
had suggested that the arguments go to both matters if
that met with the approval of counsel. Mr. Hunt then
requested that the arguments ought to be reported because he felt they would have a bearing if the court was
going to explore what is an appropriate alimony in modifying the decree. He asserted that it was inappropriate to
confine the inquiry to the economic proceedings and conditions of the respective status of the parties.
Mr. Burton then reviewed the testimony which had
been given at the proceeding and argued that the facts
elicited supported the plaintiff's position that the defendant was in contempt and that the divorce decree should
not be amended. Numerous cases were cited by Mr. Burton in support of his contentions that employment of the
plaintiff was not a sufficient change in circumstances to
warrant modification of the decree. It was also asserted
that there had been no change in the defendant's circumstances sufficient to require modification of the decree.
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Mr. Hunt responded by contending that there had
been a change in circumstances and that the alimony provision of the divorce decree should be changed. He was
of the opinion that the decree was unfair and that the
agreement should be re-examined and the alimony reduced. He asserted that the divorce decree and Property
Settlement Agreement came very close to being a fraud
on the court. Mr. Hunt cited various cases in support of
his arguments and referred to testimony which he felt
supported his theories.
At the conclusion of the arguments of counsel the
case was submitted to the court, at which time the matter
was taken under advisement.
HAL M. ·wALTON
Third Judicial District Court
Official Court Reporter
Duly certified March 6, 1971.

(Title of Court and Cause)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
185

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt, and
Defendant's Motion for Modification of Decree came on
for hearing on October 1, 1970, and not being completed
on that day were again heard on October 2 and October
5, 1970, the plaintiff appearing in person and hy c~nnsel,
Thomas M. Burton, and the defendant appearing m person and by counsel, Gayle Dean Hunt.
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'rl1e matter having bt-en fully presented, argued and
submitted and the Court now being fully advised in the
premises finds and concludes as follows:
1. That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce,
said order having been based on a stipulation of the parties. The contempt is based on defendant's failure and
refusal to pay the designated amounts, wh(m he at all
times had sufficient earnings to do so. Further, defendant has made transfers of property without consideration
and held large sums of cash to defeat plaintiff's efforts
to execute on prior judgments obtained for delinquent
alimony.
2. That the plaintiff is well qualified both from the
standpoint of formal education and years of experience
in her chosen field of endeavor to earn sufficient funds to
adequately maintain herself. This was demonstrated
throughout the time of the marriage and is particularly
true now that she has again taken full-time employment,
her employment at the time of the Decree having been
only part-time.
3. That the agreement of the parties and the subsequent award of alimony was based in part on the recognition of plaintiff's efforts to assist defendant in obtaining
his medical education and the Court find that her efforts
were substantial in this regard since defendant's internship and residency years are deemed to be just as important to his over-all education as the more formal education
obtained while in medical school.
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4. That the plaintiff is reasonably entitled to alimony for a given period of time sufficient to permit her
to properly adjust to single life; however, to allow permanent alimony in the amount provided for in the Decree
is unjust, unnecessary, and not equitable and the Decree
lt
is consequently modified to provide for the payment of
said amounts of alimony through the month of May, 1971,
a period of four years in all, said payments to cease thereafter, except for the payment of the nominal sum of $1.00
per year necessary to preserve the right of plaintiff to
future assistance should a true need arise.
5. That the defendant is sentenced to ten (10) days
in the County Jail as punishment for his contempt; however, a stay of execution is entered and he is given an
opportunity to purge himself of said contempt by making
all future payments of alimon~- promptly when dur, and
provided further, that he make immediate arrangements
to pay all of the alimony arrearage due to plaintiff, including the amounts thereof represented b~- judgments
obtained.

G.

The plaintiff is restrained from levying execution
on any and all of defendant's property so long as he
abides by the conditions set forth in paragraph 5 aboYe.
7. That plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the
amount of $250.00 in connection with the contempt matter.
Dated this 5th day of November, 1970.
GORDON R. HALL, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed November 5, 1970.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND TO AMEND
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, by her counsel Thomas M.
Burton and pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby moves the above-entitled Court
for a new trial only on the issue of the modification of
this Court's Decree, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence material to plaintiff's position in the case, which
she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at trial, and to amend its Memorandum
Decision dated November 5, 1970, by vacating its finding
and conclusion that that certain Property Settlement
Agreement executed by the parties on May 16, 1967 and
approved by the Court on May 17, 1967, was unjust, and
by vacating its order reducing the alimony provision
therein contained to $1.00 a year as of May 1971 and by
denying in its entirety defendant's motion to modify decree
herein. This Motion is made upon the further ground that
one of the issues before this Court in the October 1, 1970
trial was the basis upon which this Court heretofore entered its default judgment and approved the aforesaid
Property Settlement Agreement as fair and reasonable.
The reporter's notes of the default proceedings were
ordered transcribed by D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, pursuant to one of plaintiff's previous motions for an Order
to Show Cause, but could not, at that time, be located by
the Clerk's office·. Subsequent to the said October 1, 1970
trial of plaintiff's motion to hold defendant in contempt
and defendant's motion to amend decree, the reporter's
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notes of the May 17, 1967 default proceedings were found
have been transcribed and the transcript is filed herewith'
Said motion is further based upon the affidavit 0 ~
Thomas M. Burton attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1970.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNvVALL & McCARrrHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Duly verified and filed December 3, 1970.

(Title of Court and Cause)
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL AND TO AMEND MEMORANDUM
DECISION, HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE GORDON R. HALL, A JUDGE OF
THE THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ON THE 18th
DAY OF .JANUARY, 1971
468

The record showed that the respective counsel for
Lee C. Felt, the plaintiff, and Rob<•rt S. Felt, the defendant, were present in court. Mr. Burton first presented
his arguments as to wh~- a nPw trial should be granted
and the court's previous Memorandum Decision modified.
The first reason advanced for the granting of plaintiff's motion was that the isslw of modification of the
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divorce decree was not timely heard.
tended that defendant's motion to have
fied should not have been heard until
alimony payments was cured through
fendant to plaintiff.

)9

:il

~fr. Burton con-

the decree modithe arrearage in
payment by de-

The second ground for granting plaintiff's motion
for a new trial advanced by Mr. Burton was that the
agre«ment entered into between the parties and incorporated into the divorce decree providing for payment by
defendant to plaintiff of $1,000.00 a month was in essence
a Property Settlement Agreement and not an agreement
providing for the payment of alimony. Therefore, the
court was without authority to modify said agreement.
The third ground for granting the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial advanced by Mr. Burton was that the
newly discovered reporter's transcript of the divorce
proceeding would make it clear that the parties and the
court anticipated that the plaintiff would seek full time
employment following the granting of the divorce. Therefore, the plaintiff's subsequent full time employment is
not a change of circumstances which merits modification
of alimony in the decree.
The final argument asserted by Mr. Burton was that
there was no basis for the court's finding that the original
divorce decree was unreasonable since both parties were
represented by counsel and that the court sp€cifically
found at the time of the default proceeding that the del'ree was reasonable.
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Mr. Hunt argued that the transcript of the original
divorce hearing added nothing to the matters before the
court. He argued that the welfare of the parties involved
impelled a change and that the court had jurisdiction to .93
make a change in the alimony arrangement. He contended that the court had continuing jurisdiction in the
matter of modifying the alimony payment set out in the
decree. Mr. Burto11 then submitted the Utah Supreme
Court case of Allen v. Allen, 475 P.2d 1021, in support
of his arguments. Mr. Hnnt and Mr. Burton thereafter
submitted the matter to the conrt. The court commented
that in regards to Mr. Burton's final argument that the
court in rendering its decision for defendant did not intend to imply that the prior decision rendered by the
court in the divorce hearing was unjust or inequitable.
The court stated that by reason of a change in circnmstances, the conrt has found that the decree has becomP
unjust and unreasonable and that it didn't imply that
such decree was ever unjust or inequitable at the time it
was first entered. Citation of the Allen case was acknowledged by the court but distinguished on the basis that
the facts and circumstances were not the same as the
matter before the court. The plaintiff's motion for a
new trial and to amend the Memorandum Decision "-as
then denied.
HAL M. WALTON
Official Conrt Reporter
Third Judicial District Court
Duly Certified March G, 1971. FilPd March 30, 1971.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
93

The above case was scheduled for hearing and heard
January 8th and January 18, 1971, on plaintiff's Motion
for New Trial, plaintiff being represented by counsel,
Thomas M. Burton, and defendant by counsel, Gayle Dean
Hunt, whereupon arguments of counsel were heard and
the Court being fully advised in the premises and having
determined that said Motion for New Trial should be
denied, NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HE.RE.BY ORDERED, that the Motion for
New Trial of plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, herein be, and the
same is hereby denied.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1971.
GORDONR. HALL, JUDGE
Duly attested and filed February 2, 1971.

(Title of Court and Cause)
ORDER MODIFYING DIVORCE DECREE
AND RESPECTING CONTEMPT

207

The above case was scheduled for hearing and was
heard October 1, 2, and 5, 1970, before the Hon. Gordon
R. Hall, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court on
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and on
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defendant's Motion for Modification of Divorce Deere€ I
plaintiff appearing in person and by her counsel, Thoma~
M. Burton, and defendant appearing in person and by
his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt. Testimony was taken
evidence introduced and arguments heard and the Court 08
being fully advised in the premises and having made and
entered herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:

1. Defendant is ordered to make future payments
of alimony as required in this Order, promptly when due.
2. That defendant is hereby ordered to pay $250.00
to plaintiff for attorney's fees.
3. That the Divorce Decree herein is modified as
follows: monthly alimony payments are provided for in
the Divorce Decree herein shall be paid by defendant to
plaintiff through the month of May, 1971, a period of four
years in all, said payments to cease thereafkr, exc<'pt for
the payment of a nominal snm of $1.00 per year necessary
to preserve the right of plaintiff to fnture assistancP
should a trne need arise.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1971.
GORDON R. HALL, Judge
Duly atteskd and filed February 2, 1971.
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(Title of Court and Cause)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

S

'rhe above case was scheduled for hearing and was
heard October 1, 2, and 5, 1970, before the Hon. Gordon
R. Hall, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court on
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and on
defendant's Motion for Modification of Divorce Decree,
plaintiff appearing in person and by her counsel, Thomas
M. Burton, and defendant appearing in person and by
his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt. Testimony was taken,
evidence introduced and arguments heard and the Court
being fully advised in the premises now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce,
said order having been based on a stipulation of the
parties. The contempt is based on defendant's failure and
refusal to pay the designated amounts, when he at all
times had sufficient earnings to do so. Further, defendant
has made transfers of property without consideration
and held large sums of cash to def eat plaintiff's efforts
to execute on prior judgments obtained for delinquent
alimony.

2. The court made a memorandum decision herein
dated November 5, 1970, indicating that defendant be
sentenced to ten days in jail for contempt, a stay of exe69

cution to be entered and defendant given an opportunity
to purge himself of said contempt by payment of futnr~
payments of alimony as ordered, thereby, and of arrearages including sums represented by judgments then due.
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3. Between that time and the present time, defendant has paid said arrearages and current sums owing
and has therefore, purged himself of said contempt subject only to said order as it relates to future payments
required thereby.
4. Plaintiff has been required to engage an attorney
to prosecute her petition herein.

5.

A reasonable fee for the services of said attornPy

is $250.00.
6. That the plaintiff is well qualified both from the
standpoint of formal education and years of experiencP
in her chosen field of endeavor to earn suficient funds
to adequately maintain herself. This was demonstrated
throughout the time of the marriage and is particularlY
true now that she has again taken foll-time employment.
her employment at the time of the Decree having bePn
only part-time, and the record of the default diyorce hearing revealing that at said time plaintiff was under a
doctor's care and presented a doctor's statement in support of a motion to shorten tiine for obtaining a divoref'
because of illnPss. At the present time plaintiff is in good
health.
7. 'l'hat the agreement of tlH' partiPs and the subsequent award of alimony was bast>d in part on the reeog70

nition of plaintiff's efforts to assist defendant in obtaining his medical education and the Court finds that her
efforts were substantial in this regard since defendant's
internship and residency years are deemed to be just
as important to his over-all education as the more formal
education obtained while in medical school, however, defendant's formal education was substantially completed
prior to marriage to the plaintiff, the marriage having
occurred near Christmas of 1949 and the defendant having graduated from medical school the following Spring.
8. That the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to alimony for a given period of time sufficient to pennit her
to properly adjust to single life; as to the award and
amount thereof at the time of the divorce decree, this
Court makes no finding; however, to continue to allow
permanent alimony in the amount provided for in the Decree in light of the present situation and circumstances
of parties is unjust, unnecessary, and not equitable and
the Decree should be consequently modified to provide
for the payment of said amounts of alimony through the
month of May, 1971, a period of four years in all, said
payments to cease thereafter, except for the payment of
the nominal sum of $1.00 per year necessary to preserve
the right of plaintiff to future assistance should a true
need arise.
9. Plaintiff's actual earnings from employment
from consultation work or fees as the same might be
designated and from im'estments are sufficient to adequately maintain her ,vithout dependence upon defendant.
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10. Since the Divorce Decree herein, the defendant
is remarried to a woman who has one child whose father
is deceased, and defendant supports said wife and child·
and at the present time the plaintiff is a singlei woman. '
11. Since the Divorce Decree herein, defendant's
costs of doing business has substantially increased; his
income has increased but not commensurate with the increase in cost of doing business.
12. Plaintiff's income from employment, consultation work and investments is substantially higher than at
the time of the Divorce Decree.
13. Plaintiff, by the Divorce Decree, was assigned
life insurance policy No. 316060 in the sum of $50,000.00,
double indemnity, on defendant's life with permission by
the property settlement agreement to "convert'' or
"replace" the same with a different t~-pe, or other insurance policy; subsequently plaintiff purportedly acting
under this clause but with defendant's consent, obtained
a new $60,000.00 double indemnity life insurance policy
with a different insurance company on defendant's life
retaining the old policy and neither replacing nor cancPlling the old policy. Defendant has requested the Court
to terminate plaintiff's rights under the Divorce Decree
to maintain policies on defendant's life; however, defendant has failed to present adequate evidence to justify thP
Court in so doing.
14. Substantial changes in the circumstances and
situation of parties hereto han~ occurred since the date
of the Divorce Decree.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce.
(2) That the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to
alimony for a given period of time sufficient to permit
her to properly adjust to single life; however, to continue
to allow permanent alimony in the amount provided for
in the Decree in light of the present situation and circumstances of parties, is unjust, unnecessary, and not
equitable and the Decree should be consequently modified
to provide for the payment of said amounts of alimony
through the month of May, 1971, a period of four years
in all, said payments to cease therafter, except for the
payment of the nominal sum of $1.00 per year necessary
to preserve the right of plaintiff to future assistance
should a true need arise.
( 3) This court determined that defendant should
be sentenced to ten days in the County Jail as punishment
for contempt, a stay of execution to be entered and defendant given an opportunity to purge himself of said
contempt by making all future payments of alimony
promptly when due, and provided further, that he make
immediate arrangements to pay all of the alimony arrearage due to plaintiff, including the amounts thereof
represented by judgments obtained. Since the date of the
hearing and decision herein, defendant has paid such
arrearage and judgments and should consequently be
purged of such contempt subject only to making future
payments in accordance with said decision.
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( 4) The plaintiff should be restrained from levying
any execntion herein so long as defendant abides by the
conditions set forth in paragraph three above.
( 5) That plaintiff should be awarded attorney fees
in the amount of $250.00 in connection with the contempt
matter.
(6) Plaintiff's maintenance of life insurance on defendant's life should not, at this time, be altered or prevented by the Court.
DATED this 2nd day of Febrnar)·, 1971.
GORDON R. HALL, .JUDGE
Duly attested and filed February 2, 1971.

(Title of Court and Cause)
NOTICE OF
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APP.B~AL

The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, hereby appeals to the Snprerne Court of the State of Utah from an Order of the
Court, modifying the Decree herein in fayor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and from this Conrt's
Order denying plaintiff's timel:· motion for a nt'". trial
entered on February 2, 1971.
DATED this 16th day of Febrnar:·, 1971
YAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORKWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Duly verified and filed Februar:· 17, 1971.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
2

I, W. STERLING EVANS, Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that the hereto attached
files contain all the original papers as requested by
Designation on file herein, filed in the Court in the above
entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal filed on
February 17, 1971. I further certify that the above described documents constitute the Judgment Roll and that
the same is a true and correct transcript of the record as
it appears in my office.
I further certify that an Undertaking on Appeal in
due form has been properly filed and that the same was
filed on February 17, 1971.
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date
transmitted to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,
pursuant to such appeal.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said Court at
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of March, 1971.
s/W. Sterling E.vans
Clerk Third District Court
Duly certified and filed March 30, 1971.
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